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SITUATION I 
CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
(a) State X declares that all distinction between con-
ditional and absolute contraband is abolished and that 
all goods bound for Y will be treated as contraband. 
(b) State Y declares all ports of X blockaded and 
Inail).tains a line 3 miles off the coast of state D to pre-
vent vessels passing up the river Dana which is the sole 
navigable ·wa.ter.,vay thrQugh state D to the capital of 
state X. 
What are the rights of the belligerents and of the 
neutrals? 
SOLUTION 
(a) State X 1nay declare all distinction between abso-
lute and conditional contraband abolished, but this does 
not make all goods contraband nor does it give to state 
X a right to treat all articles bound for Y as contraband. 
(b) State Y n1ay not lawfully 1naintain a blockade of 
the ports of state X to which there is access only through 
a navigable river of neutral state D; nor may state Y 
prevent vessels from entering the river Dana, though it 
may seize vessels outside neutral jurisdiction when trans-
porting prohibited goods having an ultimate enemy 
destination. 
NOTES 
Earlier discussions of oontraband.-Contraband has 
often been the subject of discussion at the Naval War 
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College in past years.1 From these discussions it will be 
evident that opinions of different states have from time 
to time changed. In general, though not in every case, 
belligerents have been inclined to extend the list of con-
traband and neutrals ha~e en9-~avored to restrict the 
list. vVhen the maintenanc~ , .P{ )?l_o~l~ade is easy, the 
contraband list might be short; .and when blockade was 
difficult or impossible, the list would be extended. The 
idea of contraband is so old that there are many exaJ.IIlples 
of diversity in practice. 
Early attitude toward contraband.-The word contra-
band, Latin contrabandum, implied disregard of a de-
cree or prohibition. The word was used in early times 
in deferring to domestic restrict~ons usually upon trade 
in named articles as in regard to trade in salt which often 
was a government monopoly. Later prohibitions were 
issued restricting within specified areas trade in ma-
terials "\vhich might be of use in war. 
The prohibition on export of arms, an idea receiving 
particular attention again in the twentieth century, was 
common in Roman and Byzantine periods when it was 
extended to supplies which might be serviceable to pos-
sible enemies. At times religious penalties were pre-
scribed by the early church for those who furnished war 
materials to infidels. In· these instances the measures 
taken were domestic or applied to those under the au-
thority of the source of the prohibitions and the prohi-
bitions might be applied both in time of peace and in time 
of war. l(ings of England in the fourteenth century is-
sued prohibitions, sometimes in regard to furnishing 
articles to nationals of named states and sometimes in 
regard to furnishing specified articles to any foreigner. 
England also made treaties in this century prohibiting 
the supplying of speciyed articles under penalty of 
forfeiture to the king (Edward III, 1370). 
1 For references, s,ee General Index to' International Law Situations, 
'I'opics, Dis:cussion~, Documents, and Decisions, Vols. I to XXX, 1901-30. 
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Gradually the prohibitions aimed at regulating domes-
tic trade began to extend to the activities of foreign mer- -
chants in time of war. This extension created the de-
mand that for the security of traders the list of prohib-
ited areas should be made known either by previous 
treaty agreement or by special proclamation, and such 
action beea1ne usilal from the seventeenth century. The 
early enu1nerations 'vere not based on any uniform prin-
ciple but 'vere often deter1nined by political or other 
n1otives. 
It was easy to extend the domestic prohibition of 
furnishing certain goods to certain areas or to infidels 
by analogy to the furnishing ,of such goods to enemies. 
As belligerents would have no authority over acts 
of traders within neutral jurisdiction, they began to 
seize goods of the nature of contraband when these 
were outside of the im1nediate control of the neutral 
state, as in transit on the high sea. Here there would 
be .a degree of conflict between the rights of the neu-
tral to protect the shipping under its national flag and 
the right of the belligerent to prevent the delivery to 
his opponent of goods which might be used for his de-
feat or injury. 'rhe right of the belligerent w·as to a 
degree gradually conceded as dominant over the right 
of the neutral trader, and the belligerent assumed the 
right to enumerate by procla1nation, or otherwise to 
determine, what should be regarded as under the ban. 
·The furnishing of contraband was, at first, regarded 
as an act for which the state should be held respQnsible. 
Gradually the problem of supplying of contraband by 
subjects of neutral states gave rise to controversies. At-
tempts were made to extend to states responsibility for 
acts of their subjects. The\ discussions of these topics 
were often by theologians because prohibitions had been 
against furnishing contraband to infidels and the course 
of argumentation.· differed from modern discussions 
t~ough involving like principles. This was especially 
true o£ the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
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In a posthun1ous book o£ Gentilis (1552-1608), the 
mingling of the 1nodern and earlier attitude is sho\vn. 
The negative aspect o£ the Golden Rule " that one should 
not do unto others \vhat he would not that they should 
do to him" was emphasized. Gentilis quotes the civil 
laws: 
" Let no one have the power to transport wine, oil, or any 
liquid to heathendonl even to give them a taste, to say nothing 
ci' satisfying the demands of trade." "Let no one dare to sell 
to alien heathen * * * coats of mail, shields, bows, arrows,. 
broadswords, swords, or arms of any other sort whatsoever. 
Let absolutely no weapons be retailed to them by anyone, and 
no iron at all, whether already made up or not, for it would be 
harmful to the Rmnan Empire, and would approach treason 
to furnish the heathen, who ought to be without equiptnent, with 
weapons to 1nake them stronger. But' if anyon~ shall have sold 
any kind of arms anywhere to alien heathen of any nation what-
soever in violation of the interdicts of our holy religion, we 
decree that all his goods be straightway confiscated, and that 
he too suffer capital punish1nent." ( Gentilis, Hispanicae Advo-
ca tionis, Bk. I, Chap. XX.) 
Gentilis extends these principles in the sixteenth cen-
tury and takes up many of the questions arising £rom 
destination, proportion, and ownership of the cargo. 
The neutral began to demand that the evidence that 
the trade would be dangerous to the belligerent must 
also be clear not only £rom the nature o£ the goods 
themselves which might, if going to another neutral, be 
innocent, but that the goods i£ liable to capture must 
have an enemy destination. The nature o£ the goods 
and the destination thus became early determining £ac-
tors in liability £or contraband. 
Opinion of Grotius.-Grotius (1583-1645) in his 
epoch-marking book, De jure belli ao pacis, 1625, looking 
backward and surveying earli·ef.; prnctice_s;· said: . 
But there often arises the question. 'Vhat is pennissible 
against those who are not enemies, or do not want to be called 
enemies, but who furnish our enemies with supplies? For we 
know that this subject has been keenly debated in both ancient 
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and n1ollern times, since some champion the relentlessness of 
warfare and others the freedom of commercial relations. 
First, we must make distinctions with reference to the things 
supplied. There are some things, such as weapons, which are 
useful only in war; other things which are of no use in war, 
as those which minister to pleasure ; and others still which are 
of use both in time of war and at other times, as money, pro-
visions, ships, and naval equipment. (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis ", Vol. II, 
Book III, Chap. I, V, p. 601.) 
In this chapter Grotius shows how questions in regard 
to these three. classes of goods have been regarded both 
in early practice and in law. He quotes Seneca (3 
B.C.-65 A.D.) : 
:Money, by means of which a satellite 1nay be kept in service, 
I shall not supply. If he shall desire marbles and robes, that 
which his luxurious taste amasses will harm no one; soldiery 
and arms I shan not furnish. If, as a great favour, he seeks 
craftsmen of the stage and things which may soften his savagery, 
I shall gladly proffer them. To hin1 to whom I would not send 
triremes or ships with bronze rams, I shall send, pleasure craft, 
and sleeping-barges, and other follies of kings who revel on the 
sea. " On Benefits ", VII, xx. Car (Ibid, p. 602). 
Grotius set out also that the practices had not been 
consistent among different states or at different times 
in the same state. 
Attitude of United States.-Even before the American 
colonies became independent, the. matter of treatment of 
goods of the nature of contraband was considered in the 
Continental Congress. (III Journals 371-375, 437; IV 
Ibid, 229-232; 253-254; V Ibid, 768.) Some of these 
documents use the word contraband and refer to " pro-
hibited or contraband goods." In general during the 
eighteenth century the doctrine of "' free ships, free 
goods, except contraband of war " met with growing 
favdr-~and mariy added "free·goods"always free." 
The lists such as in the treaty with France, February 
6, 1778, vary, but cover most of the articles later included 
in the categories of absolute and conditional contraband 
though no such distinction is there made. 
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'fhe instructions issued in 1780 to commanders of 
private armed vessels having commissions or letters of 
n1arque and reprisal enjoined then1 to take care "not to 
infringe or violate the laws o£ nations, or the laws o£ 
neutrality ", and not to interfere with vessels of allies 
unless they were "employed in carrying contraband 
goods or soldiers to our enemies." 
Arnerican treaties and contraband.-The United States 
entered into about 25 treaties containing provisions 
relating to contraband during the nineteenth century. 
So1ne of the treaties provided that " in general, whatever 
is comprised under the denomination of arms and mili-
tary stores, of what description soever, shall be deemed 
objects of contraband." (Prussia, 1828.) Others, as the 
treaty 'vith Brazil, 1828, specifically enlnnerated con-
traband. 
ARTICLE XVI. This liberty of cmnmerce and navigation shall 
extend to all kinds of merchandises, excepting those only which 
are distinguished by the na1ne of contraband; and under this 
nan1e of contraband or prohibited goods shall be con1prehended-
lst. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunderbusses, mus-
kets, fuzees, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, swords, sabres, lances, 
spears, halberds and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls and 
all other things belonging to the use of these arms. 
2d. Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, infantry 
belts and clothes 1nade up in the form and for a military use. 
3d. Cavalry belts, and horses with their furniture. 
4th. And generally all kinds of arms and instru1nents of iron, 
steel, brass and copper or of any other materials manufactured, 
prepared and fonned expressly to make· war by sea or land. 
ARTICLE XVII. All other 1nerchandlse and things not compre-
llended in the articles of contrabancl, expressly enumerated and 
classified as above, shall be held and' considered as free and sub-
jects of free and lawful conunerce·, so that they 1nay be carried 
and transported in the freest n1anner by both the contracting 
parties, ev~n to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only 
those places which are at that time besieged or blockaded;. and, 
to avoid all doubt in this particular, it is declared that those 
places nre only besieged or blockaded which are actually attacked 
by a force capable of preventing the entry of the neutral. (8 U.S. 
Statut·es, Part II, pp. 390, 394.) 
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Other treaties with South American states contained 
sjtnilar provisions. 
Declaration of London lists, 1909-14.-Early in the 
"'r orld War the belligerents showed a disposition to adopt 
the list as set forth in the unratified Declaration of Lon-
don of 1909. The list of absolute contraband 'vas, 
( 1.) Arms of all kinds, including anns for sporting purposes, 
and their unassembled distinctive parts. 
(2.) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their 
unassembled distinctive parts. 
(3.) Powder and explosives specially adapted for use in 'var. 
( 4.) Gun-carriages, caissons, limbers, military ,wagons, field 
forges, and their unassembled distinctive parts. 
( 5.) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively tnilitary char-
acter. 
( 6.) All kinds of harness of a distinctively n1ilitary character. 
(7.) Saddle, draught, and pack anin1als suitab~e for use in war. 
( 8.) Articles of camp equipment, and their unassen1bled dis-
tinctive parts. 
(9.) Armor plates. 
( 10.) 'Varships and boats and their unassembled parts spe-
eially distinctive as suitable for use only in a vessel of war. 
(11). Implements and apparatus made exclusively for the manu-
facture of munitions of war, for the tnanufacture or repair of 
arms, or of military material for use on land or sea. (1909 Naval 
'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 59.) 
This list of absolute contraband 'vas the sa;me as that 
upon 'vhich agreement had· been reached at the Second 
Hague Peace Conference in 1907~ 
The subject of conditional contraband was considered 
at the sa1ne conference but "lack of time and the com-
plication of interests involved did not admit of the elabo-
ration at present [1907] of a text adopted by all." (1 
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, p. 259.) 
At this Second Peace Conference, the American naval 
delegate, Admiral Sperry, former president of theN a val 
War College, and the British seemed to be favorable to 
the exclusion of any list of conditional contraband. 
Admiral Sperry also suggested: 
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That a paragraph be added to the list already approved, stipulat-
ing that no article is to be included in this list \vhich is not in-
tended exclusively for military use, and moreover that trade in 
any article 'vhatever not legally included in the list shall never 
be prohibited as the result of a state of 'var. (Ibid, p. 1116.) 
At the London Naval Conference, 1908-09, suggestions 
fro1n the 10 leading maritime states varied in regard to 
conditional contraband. Some states favored the aboli-
tion of the category or conditional contraband as in the 
case of Spain and The Netherlands, and some made 
propositions of a general character covering articles 
"\vhich 1night be useful in peace and 'var. After n1uch 
discussion in the Conference a list of conditional con-
traband was also drawn up and embodied in the follo·w-
ing ter1ns: 
ARTICLE 24. The following articles and materials susceptible of 
use in 'var as well as for purposes of peace, are without notice, 
regarded as contraband of war, under the name of conditional 
contraband: 
(1.) Food. 
(2.) Forage and grain suitable for feeding animals. 
(3.) Clothing and fabrics for clothing, boots and shoes, suitable 
for military use. 
( 4.) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 
(5.) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their 
unassembled parts. 
(6.) Vessels, craft and boats of all kinds, floating docks, parts 
of docks, as also their unassembled parts. 
(J.) Fixed railway material and rolling-stock, and material 
for telegraphs, radio telegraphs, and telephones. 
( 8) Balloons and flying machines and their unassembled dis-
tinctive parts as also their accessories, articles and materials 
distinctive as intended for use in connection with balloons or 
flying machines. 
( 9.) Fuel ; lubricants. 
( 10.) Powder and explosives which are not specially adapted 
for use in war. 
( 11.) Barbed wire as also the implements for placing and 
cutting the same. 
(12.) Horseshoes and borseshoeing materials. 
( l :J.) Harness and saddlery 1naterial. 
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( 14.) Binocular glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds 
of nautical instruments. (1909 Naval vVar College, International 
Law r:ropics, p. 63.) 
Provision 'vas made :for additions to the above list 
by means of notified declarations in articles 23 and 25 
and for o1nissions in article 26. In articles 27 and 28 
atte1npt 'Yas 1nade to exen1pt articles 'vhich in general 
are not susceptible of use in war and also certain articles 
which 'vere in a specified :free list. Many of the articles 
specifically exen1pted in 1909 were within a few years 
of special use in 'var and before 1914 this list was seen 
to be unduly restrictive. · 
l'he Declaration of London of 1909 had been opera-
tive dEring the 'furco-Italian War in 1911-12 as sho,vn 
in the follow·ing dispatch of October 19, 1911. 
By a royal decree of October 13 the following instructions 
were approved in conformity with the principles of the Declara-
tion of Paris, April 16, 1856, which belligerent countries are 
bound to respect, with the rules of The Hague Conventions of 
October 18, 1907, and of the Declaration of London of February 
26, 1909, which the Government of the King desires to be re-
spected as well, so far as the provisions of the laws in force 
in the Kingdom allo,v, although they have not yet been ratified 
by Italy; and they will serve to regulate the conduct of naval 
commanders in the operations of capture and prize during the 
war. (1912 Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, 
p. 108.) . 
'fhe provisions of the:-!Declaration of London as re-
. gar~w,.,J~bsolute and ,c·o.nditional con~r~band, 'vere before 
1914 regarded as satisfactory in vi:e'v of the articles 
per1nitting changes on notification. There was, ho,v-
ever, understandable criticisms of the list of articles 
entune.rated as not to be declared contraband of war. 
There 'vas little criticism o£ article 29 which provided: 
Neither are the following to be regarded as contraband of 
war: 
(1) Articles and materials serving exclusively for the care 
of the sick and wounded. They may, nevertheless, in case of 
urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of com-
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pensation, be requisitioned, if their destination is that specified 
in Article 30. 
(2) Articles and materials intended for the use of the vessel 
in which they are found, as well as those for the use of her 
crew and passengers during the voyage (1909 Naval 'Var Col-
lege, International Law Topics, p. 71.) 
l\1any of the provisions of the Declaration of London 
·were embodied in national rules before 1914 and \vhile 
some of these re1nained in force during the World War, 
the provisions relating to contraband because of changes 
in the use of .1naterials and methods of \varfare. suffered 
\vide extensions. 
Early ·world War changes in contrabarnd lists.-The 
British Government had on August 5, 1914, made known 
that it \Vould regard as contraband the articles na~ed 
as absolute and conditional contraband in the Declara-
tion of London \vith the transfer of aircraft fron1 the · 
conditional to the absolute list. 
On August 6, 1914, the A1nerican Secretary of State 
addressed to the American A1nbassadors in the bellig-
erent states and the Minister to Belgium an inquiry as to 
whether the respective states \Vere "\Villing to agree that 
the la\vs of naval \varfare laid do,vn by the Declaration 
of London, 1909, shall be applicable to naval warfare 
during the present European conflict, provided that the 
governments \vith \Vhom" they \Vere or might be at 
\Var also agree tq such appl~cation. The Secretary also 
said, " You will further state that this Governn1ent be-
lieves that acceptance of these laws by the belligerents 
would prevent grave n~isunderstandings \Vhich may 
arise as to the relations between belligerent and neutral 
po,vers. It, therefore, ea!·nestly hopes that this inquiry 
n1ay receive favorable consideration." (1914 U.S. For-
eign Relations, Supplement, p. 216.) 
Germany, August 10, and Austria-Hungary, August 
13, replied to the effect that they \Vould observe the pro-
visions of the Declaration of London conditioned upon 
"like observance on the part of the enemy." 
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As replies 'vere delayed fro1n other states, the Secre-
tary of State sent another telegra1n, August 19, pressing 
for reply. The reply fro1n the British Foreign Office 
dated August 22 but received in Washington August 26, 
1914, stated that the British Government had "decided 
to adopt generally the rules of the declaration in ques-
tion, subject to certain n1odifications and additions 'vhich 
they judge indispensable to the efficient conduct of their 
naval operations." These n1odifications changed the 
lists of contraband, duration o:f liability and presuinp-
tion of destination as 'vell as other provisions. Russia. 
and France :follo,ved Great Britain. The Govern1nent of 
the United States examined the British propositio.ns 
hoping they might be of such character that the Govern-
ment could advise general acceptance, but could not 
reach such a concl usj on. Nevertheless, in a note of 
September 26, 1914, the Acting Secretary of State 'vrote: 
* * * The United States stands ready either to accept the 
declaration as a whole, provided all of the belligerents accept 
it, or, to accept it for the period of the war with Inodifications 
and additions acceptable, on the one hand, to the United States 
and the Netherlands, the two neutral signatories, and, on th(_=) 
other hand, to all of the belligerents. 
This Government in seeking general acceptance of the declara 
tion as a code of naval warfare for the present war hacl in mind 
the adoption of the declaration as a whole and not such part of 
it as might be acceptable to certain belligerents and not to oth~r 
belligerents. It considered that the declaration was to be ap-
plied as a cmnplete code of which no rule could be ignorecl or surl-
plemented, and in so doing it followed Article 65· of the declara-
tion, \Vhich stipulates: "The pr·ovisions of t_he present declaration 
must be treated as a whole and ca"..lnot be separated." 
The only reasonable explanation for the inclusion in the clec· 
laration of this requirement is that the instrument is cmnposed 
largely of compromises on the part of the govennnen ts repre-
sented at the conference. Although tbe cleclara tion is introduced 
with a general statement that "the signatory powers are agreed" 
that the rules contained in the declaration "correspond in sub-
stance with the generally recognized principles of international 
I a w ?', the proceedings of the conference as well as the docu1nents 
relating to it prove that an agreement on many of the articles 
73500-34--2 
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wns reached through reciprocal concessions. Being conceived in 
compromise and concession the declaration was accepted by the 
Government of the United States at the conference in London 
in the earnest hope that it might finally compose the differences 
which existed as to neutral rights and neutral duties, although 
in so accepting this Government was compelled to abandon cer-
tain rules of conduct which it has heretofore always maintained. 
As might be expected in a settletnent of divergent views and 
vractices by mutual concession the Declaration of London con-
tains provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the 
respective interests of neutrals and belligerents. But it is now 
proposed by Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable 
to belligerents and to recast other provisions so that they will be 
less favorable to neutral interests. The result is a set of rules 
which limits neutrals' rights far more than does the declaration 
itself treated as a whole. 'Var, in any event, bears heavily 
upon a neutral nation. The interrup'tion of its commerce and 
the limitations placed upon its trade are sufficiently burdensome 
t!nder the rules of the Declaration of London. In consenting 
tQ those rules the Government of the United States n1ade 
great concessions on its part and it does not feel that it can, 
in justice to its own people, go further. It cannot consent to 
the retention of a part of this compromise settlement and to 
the rejection of another part. The adoption of the declaration 
so modified is contrary to the customary procedure incid'ent to 
compromise settlements, to the express provisions of the dec-
laration itself, and to the spirit which induced its signature. 
(Ibid, p. 227.) 
This note :further stated that the British modifications 
struck at accepted neutral rights, created misunderstand-
ings, revised practices s~pposed to be abandoned even 
by Great Britain and·, · i:£ admitted, might place the 
United States in an equivocat position 'vhich 1night im-
peril the :friendly relations with Great Britain. 
In a memorandun1 o:£ a conference o:£ Acting Secre-
tary Lansing 'vith the British Ambassador on September 
29, 1914, it is sai~.' 
A discussion of the provisions of the order in council followed 
in which the Ambassador said that he agreed that the order in 
council practically made foodstuffs absolute contraband, \Vhich 
was contrary to the British traditional policy as well as. to that 
of the United States. He said that the inunediate cause had 
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been the introduction through Rotterdam in first days of the 
war of large quantities of food supplies for the German army in 
Belgium, and that it seemed absolutely necessary to stop this 
traffic. 
I replied that, w bile I appreciated that such reasons n1ust 
weigh yer~r heaYily with those responsible for the successful con-
duct of the war, it seemed unfortunate that some other Ineans 
could not have been found to accomplish the desired purpose, 
either by getting the Netherlands to place an embargo on food-
~tuffs and other conditional contraband or by agreeing not to re-
export such articles. The Ambassador said that he agreed that 
would be Inuch the better way, and that he believed it could 
be done. 
He said that now the chief anxiety see1ned to be in regard to 
shipinents of copper and petroleum and also of · Swedish iron, and 
that the British Government was stopping vessels 'vith such car-
goes and purchasing them. He suggested that possibly the diffi-
culty ere a ted by the orcler in council could be removed by re-
scinding it and adding to the list of absolute contraband petro-
lpum products, copper, barbed wire and other artici'es of like 
nature now used almost exclusively for war purposes. 
I said that as to this suggestion I could not speak for the 
Government but that it seemed worthy of consideration as it 
might offer a n1eans of getting rid of the order in council which 
certainly menaced the very friendly relations existing if it became 
the subject of discussion by the press. I told him that I did not 
think that the feeling which the order in council would arouse 
when generally understood, would be among the shippers as much 
as among the A1nerican public at large; and that, even if no case 
arose under it, the fact that the British Govern1nent had issued 
a decree, which Inenaced the cmnmercial rights of the United 
States as a neutral, in violation of the generally accepted rules 
of international law, would undoubtedly cause irritation, if not 
indignation, and might change the sentiment of the American 
people, of which Great Britain had no reason to complain at the 
present time. (Ibid., p. 234.) 
There 'vas n1uch interchange of opinion between the 
belligerents and neutrals in regard to contraband. The 
European neutral states being the smaller states were 
often obliged to yield to the terms proposed by the strong 
belligerents. Each belligerent brought forth the argu-
Jnent that its extreme action was based on self-defense 
which .n1ight justify the setting aside its obligations 
1nuler international law. 
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The United States, a powerful neutral, in its early 
contentions maintained the attitude of a state about to 
insist upon its neutral rights. Great Britain in a com-
Inunication o:f October 9, 1914, indicated that its list of 
contraband should, subject to certain additions and modi-
fications, conform to the Declaration of London and that 
it was hoped this. list would meet the approval of the 
United States. This proposed list did include under 
absolute contraband rubber and ores 'vhich under article 
28 of the Declaration o:f London had unwisely been 
placed in the list of articles not to be declared contra-
band of 'var .. Some equable adjusbnent bet,veen the 
Department of State of the United States and Great 
Britain on the basis of actual war conditions and needs 
see1ned to be foreshaclo,ved in early October 1914. On 
October 15, Mr. "\Valter Hines Page, A1nbassador to 
Great Britain, said in a co1nmunication to the Secretary 
Gf State: 
I recom1nend most earnestly the substantial acceptance of the 
uew order in council or our acquiescence with a reservation of 
whatever rights we may have; and I reconunend prompt informa-
tion to the British Government of such action. (1914 U.S. For-
eign Relations, Supplement, p. 2.49.) 
To follow this recommendation would involve aban-
doning many o:f the positions 'vhich the State Depart-
nlent had recently taken and on October 16 the Depart-
Inent of State sent to the American An1bassador in 
Great Britain a telegram embodying certain new plans. 
The desire of this Govenunent is ·to obtain from the British 
Government the issuance of an order in council adopting th~ 
declaration without any an1endment whatsoever and to obtain 
from France and Russia like decrees, vd1ich they will undoubt-
edly issue if Great Britain sets the example. Such an adoption 
by the allied Govenunents will put in force the acceptance of the 
Declaration of London by Gennany and Austria, 'Yhich will thus 
becmne for all the belligerent powers the code of naval warfare 
during the present conflict. This is the ailn of the United State8. 
It cannot be accomplished if the declaration is changed in any 
way as Gern1any and Austria would not giYe their consent to a 
change. 
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In the frequent informal and confidential conversations which 
have taken place here and in the admirable frankness with which 
Sir Edward Grey has stated the reasons for the action which 
Great Britain has deemed it necessary to take in regard to the 
declaration, this Government feels that it fully understands and 
appreciates the British position, and is not disposed to place 
obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of the purposes which 
the British representatives have so frankly stated. 
The confidence thus reported in this Government makes it 
appreciate n1ore than eYer the staunch friendship of Great Britain 
for the United States, which it hopes always to deserve. 
This GoYernment would not feel \varranted in offering any sug-
gestion to the Briti-sh GoYernment as to a course which would meet 
the wishes of this GoYertunent and at the same time accomplish 
the ends which Great Britain seeks, but you might in the strictest 
confidence intimate to Sir Edward Grey the following plan, at the 
same time stating Yery explicitly that it is your personal sugges-
tion and not one for ·which your GoYernment is responsible. 
Let the British GoYernment issue an order in council accepting 
the Declaration of London without change or addition, and re-
pealing all preYious conflicting orders in council. 
Let this order in council be followed by a proclamation adding 
articles to the lists of absolute and conditional contraband by 
virtue of the authority conferred by Articles 23 and 25 of the 
declaration. 
Let the proclamation be followed by another order in council, 
of \Vhich the United States need not be previously advised, declar-
ing that, \Vhen one of His l\lajesty's Principal Secretaries of State 
is conYinced that a port or the territory of a neutral country is 
being used as a base for the transit of supplies for an enemy gov-
ernlnent a proclan1ation shall issue declaring that such port or 
territory has acquired enemy character in so far as trade in 
contraband is concerned and that vessels trading therewith shall 
be thereafter subject to the rules of the declaration governing 
trade to enemy's territory. 
it is true that the latter order in council would be based on a 
new principle. The excuse \vould be that the Declaration of Lon-
dqn failing to provide for such an exceptional condition as exists, 
a belligerent has a right to give a reasonable interpretation to 
the rules of the declaration so that they will not leave him help-
less to prevent an eqemy from obtaining supplies for his military 
forces although the belligerent may possess the power and would 
have the right to do so if the port or territory 'vas occupied by 
the enemy. 
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\Vhen the last-mentioned order in council is issued, I am con-
Yinced that a full explanation "of its nature and necessity would 
meet with liberal consideration by this Governrnent and not be 
the subject of serious objection. 
I repeat that any suggestion, which you may make to Sir, 
Edward Grey, must be done in an entirely personal way and with 
the distinct understanding that this Governn1ent is in no way 
responsible for what you may say. (Ibid, p. 249.) 
In his telegram from London of October 15, 1914, re-
lating to differences in regard to the Declaration of Lon-
don and shipping questions, the American Ambassador, 
Mr. Page, had said: 
The question seems wholly different here fron1 what it prob-
ably seems in Washington. There it is a more or less academic 
discussion. Here it is a matter of life and death for English-· 
speaking civilization. It is not a happy tin1e to raise contro-
versies that can be avoided or postponed. Nothing can be 
gained and every chance for useful cooperation for peace can 
easily be thrown away and is now in jeopardy. In jeopardy also 
are our friendly relations with Great Britain in the sorest time 
of need in her history. I know that this is the correct, larger 
view. (Ibid, p. 248.) 
The United States as a neutral state had proposed 
the maintenance of neutral rights and the President him4 
self replied on October 16. 
Beg that you will not regard the position of this Government 
as merely acadernic. Contact with opinion on this side the 
water would materially alter your view. Lansing has pointed 
out to you in personal confidential despatch of this date how 
completely all the British Government seeks can be accomplished 
without the least friction with this Government and without 
touching opinion on this side the water on an exceedingly tender 
spot. I must urge you to realize this aspect of the rna tter and 
to use your utmost persuasive efforts to effect an understanding, 
which we earnestly desire, by the method we have gone out of 
our way to sugg~st, which will put the whole case in unimpeach-
able: form . . 
This is private and for your guidance. 
WOODROW \VILSON. 
(Ibid, p. 252.) 
Disappearance of contraband distinctions.-In a proc-
lalnation revising the British contraband list, October 
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29, 1914, there \Yere t-wo schedules, one to be treated as 
absolute contraband and the other as conditional con-
traband. 
Vigorous protests had arisen against the German War 
Zone procla1nation of February 4, 1915, which declared 
the \Vaters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland 
to be comprised "\Yithin the seat of war and that all enen1y mer-
chant vessels found in those waters after the eighteenth instant 
will be destroyed although it may not always be possible to save 
crews and passengers. 
Neutral Yessels expose themselves to danger within this zone 
of war since in view of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered 
by the British Government on January thirty-first and of the 
contingencies of maritime warfare it cannot always be avoided 
that neutral yessels suffer from attacks intended to strike enemy 
ships. ( 1915 U.S. Foreign· Relations, Supplen1ent, p. 94.) 
rfhe attitude of Great Britain in regard to American 
co1nn1unications on contraband and 1naritime warfare in 
general as vie,ved by the An1erican An1bassador in Great 
Britain 1nay be seen in the follovving telegram of May 
21, 1915, to the Sec.retary of State: 
Unofficial critics praise the courtesy and admit the propriety 
of our communications, but they regard then1 as re1note and 
impracticable. They point out that we haYe not carried our 
voints: namely, that copper should not be contraband, that ships 
should be searched at sea, that to-order cargoes should be valid, 
that our export trade bad fallen off because of the war. They 
point out tilese in good-natured criticisn1 as evidence of the 
American love of protest for political effect at home. vVhile the 
official reception of our communications is dignified, the un-
official and general attitude to them is a smile at our love of 
letter writing as at Fourth of July orations. They quietly laugh 
at our effort to regulate sea warfare under new conditions by 
what they regard as lawyers' disquisitions out of textbooks. They 
[receive] them with courtesy, pay no further attention to the111, 
proceed to settle our -shipping disputes with an effort at gen-
erosity an'd quadnipi~ ' thieir order's :fr"6n:i '' \is of war materials.' 
They care nothing for our definitions or general protests but are 
willing to do us every practical favor and will under no condi-
tions either take our advice or offend us. They regard our 
writings as addressed either to complaining shippers or to poli-
ticians at home. 
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For these reasons complaints about concrete cases as they 
arise are tnore effective than general communications about rules 
of sea warfare, which must be revised by the submarine, the 
aeroplane, the mine and our own precedents. (Ibid, p. 147.) 
Further restrictions were put by the Allied Powers 
upon goods coming from or bound to Germany, and the 
1\..1nerican Secretary of State on March 30 said that the 
action constituted: 
a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral 
couunerce within the whole European area, and an almost un-
qualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at 
peace. 
This Government takes it for granted that there can be no 
question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its 
own ships· and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in 
time of peace is, of course, unlimited; and that sovereignty suf-
fers no din1inution in time. of war, except in so far as the prac-
tice and consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recog-
nition of certain now clearly detennined rights, which it is con-
ceded tnay be exercised by nations which are at war. (Ibid., 
p. 152.) 
In a long note of February 12, 1915, from the British 
F.,oreign Secretary to the American Ambassador, it ·was 
said: 
The n1ost difficult questions in connection with conditional con-
traband arise with reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No 
country has tnaintained more stoutly than Great Britain in tnod-
ern times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from 
interference with the foodstuffs intended for the. civil population. 
The circumstances of the present struggle are causing His 1\Ia-
jesty's Government some anxiety as to whether the existing rules 
with regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with 
the object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which 
were intended for the civil population are effective for the pur-
pose, or suitable to the conditions present. The principle which 
I have indicated above is one which His l\1ajesty's Governtnent 
have constantly had to uphold against the opposition of conti-
nental powers. In the absence of smne certainty that the rule 
would be respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great 
doubt whether it sllould be regarded as an established principle 
of international law. * * * 
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The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs in-
tended for the civil population and those for the armed f<;>rces 
or ene1ny Government disappears when the distinction between 
the civil population and the armed forces itself disappears. 
In any country in which there exists such tremendous organ-
ization for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear 
diversion [(livision] between those whom the Government is re-
~ponsible for feeding and those whom it is not. Experience shows 
that the power to requisition will be used to the fullest extent 
in order to 1nake sure that the wants of the 1nilitary are· sup-
plied, and however much goods may be imported for civil u~e it 
is by the n1ilitary that they will be consumed if n1ilitary exigen-
cies require it, especially now that the German Government have 
taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country. (Ibid., p. 
332.) 
The Department of State of the United States on Oc-
tober 28, 1915, made certain inquiries in regard to the 
control of Ger1nan resources and imports by the Govern-
ment itself. 
In Department's consideration of destination of conditional con~ 
traband, it is necessary to ascertain to what extent the military 
authorities have superseded civil authorities in the Government 
of Germany so far as control over imports are concerned, and to 
what extent the Government controls the use of articles on con-
traband list of Great Britain and her allies. Are private con-
signees free to import such articles without interference by 
authorities? (Ibid., p. 603.) 
In reply to the above query, the :following was received 
:from Berlin on December 4, 1915 : • 
Following information communicated verbally by Foreign Office; 
written answer promised : 
(1) Owing to proclan1ation issued at outbreak of war, military 
authorities theoretically have power to supersede civil authorities, 
but, practically, power has been exercised in only few instances 
and not at all in connection \Vith customs authorities. 
(2) In so far as control of use of imported goods is concerned, 
Government regards enemy's list of conditional contraband a·s of 
no importance. 
( 3) Receipt and distribution of certain imported food and 
fodder products may take place only through central organiza-
tion which distributes to civil parties only, but military authori~ 
ties have power to requisition against payment anything needed 
by army or navy. 
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Chancellor has power to grant exemption from control and dis-
tribution and military authorities have power to guarantee in 
advance freedom from requisition of designated imported con-
signments in whole or part. (Ibid, p. 622.) 
The protests of neutrals were answered after varying 
periods of delay but:at length· the Seqretary of State of 
the United States after much correspondence said in a 
communication to the Am~assador in Great Britain, 
November 11, 1916, 
SIR: With reference to the announcen1ent 1nad·e by the British 
Foreign Office, under date of April 13, 1916, of the intention of 
the British Government to treat alike absolute and conditional 
('Ontraband, you are instructed to communicate to the Foreign 
Office a formal reservation, in regard to this announcement, in 
the sense that, in view of the established practice of a number 
of maritime nations, including Great Britain and the United 
States, of disUnguishing :: between absolute and conditional con-
traband, the Government of the United States is impelled to 
notify the British Government of the reservation of all rights of 
tbe United States or its citizens in respect of any American in-
terests which may be adversely affected by the abolition of the 
distinction between these two classes of contraband, or by the 
illegal extension of the contraband lists during the present war 
by Great Britain and her allies. (1916 U.S. Foreign Relations, 
Supplement, p. 483.) 
The "Kim" and three other ships, 1915.-In October 
and November 1914 the Ki1n, the Alfred Nobel, the 
B jornsterjne Bjornson, and the Fridland, all Nor-
wegian ships except the Fridla;nd, which was Swedish, 
sailed from New York for Copenhagen. In their car-
goes were foodstuffs, rubber, and hides. The treatment 
of the cargoes and of the ships were made separate cases, 
and the reprisals order of March 11, 1915, was not made 
applicable. 
In these cases inference as to ultimate destination to 
Germany of goods consigned to Copenhagen was based 
in the first instance upon the rapid increase in the rela-
tive amount of such goods shipped to Copenhagen in 
corresponding months of 1913 and 1914. There 'vas also 
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an argument on the ground of evident deception and 
misinformation. The opinion states that 
Two important doctrines farniliar to international law come 
prominently forward for consideration; the one is embodied in 
the rule as to "continuous voyage," or continuous "transporta-
tion;" the ·~ther relates to the uitimafe liostiie"'·· destina:tion of 
conditional and absolute contraband, respectively. ( [1915] P. 
215; reprinted, 1922 Naval War College International Law Docu-
ments, 11. 50.) 
'fhe lists of contraband both absolute and conditional 
have varied from time to time and according to circum-
stances. 'The belligerent has usually stood for an ex-
t€nded list 1Yhile the neutral has desired a restricted list. 
Destination has al ,;~ays been a deciding factor in deter-
mining contraband. This has b~en particularly impor-
tant in the application of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage. It has been maintained that the . ultimate des-
tination is to the country in which the goods are actually 
to become " a part of the common stock." 
Many of the questions relating to ulti1nate destination 
were raised in the American Civil War. The party to 
whon1 the goods 1nay be consigned does not always prove 
the ultimate destination. Goods often in time of peace are 
"to order or assigns." Even the British Government in 
the American Civil War did not deny that such consign-
Inents on British vessels might not be open to suspicion 
"which might be dispelled by the shippers." Somewhat 
~imilar questions 1night arise in shipments of goods to 
branches or agents or when no consignee is na1ned. 
In the case of the J(im, however, it was stated that: 
It is, no doubt, incurp.bent upon the captors in the first instance 
to prove facts from which a reasonable ·.-mference of hostile desti-
nation can be drawn, subject to rebuttal by the claimants. (Ibid.) 
Destination.-!£ a distinction is made bet,veen absolute 
and conditional contraband, the distinction between en-
einy country and enemy forces becomes i1nportant. If 
an unfortified area becomes fortified, its status changes 
as a place to which goods may without liability be 
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shipped. I:£ the population o:£ an area 'vhich has been 
subject only to the civil law is mobilized and put under 
military control the status o:f the population changes as 
a population to which goods may 'vithout liability be 
shipped. I:£ the business o:£ a consignee o:£ a. cargo 
should suddenly change, as :from a la 'vyer with no trade 
relations and on a small salary to a merchant ship owner 
to whom large and valuable cargoes 'vere consigned, the 
burden o:f proof o:f the genuineness o:f the consignment 
n1ight be upon him. (The Hillerod, 1918, App. Cas. 
412.) 
Direct interference with neutral trade.-The accepted 
laws o:£ war give to belligerents the right to interfere 
with neutral trade in two respects, contraband and block-
ade. Extension o:£ these rights may involve continuous 
voyage or ultimate destination and there are certain 
analogies to unneutral service. During the World "\"\r ar 
as difficulties in maintaining blockades in north ~urope 
increased, 1nore reliance was placed upon the liberal or 
extreme interpretation o.:f the la,vs in regard to contra-
band without, in the early stages o:f the war, resort to 
what were later called reprisals. There 'vere also many 
changes in trade relations due to introduction o:£ new 
1neans of transportation and com1nunication between 
n1erchants in different states which made the application 
o:£ some o:£ the decisions o:£ the nineteenth century doubt-
ful. The tonnage o:£ n1odern merchant vessels 1nay make 
the problem o:£ search much n1ore difficult than in the 
early nineteenth century when the. captured vessels were 
ordinarily under 250 tons. Ho'v :far a merchant vessel 
o:£ a neutral of 25,000 or 50,000 tons with its passengers 
may be delayed or diverted :for visit or search or what 
may justify such delay or diversion are still debatable 
questions. The changes in the nature o:f materials used 
in war have made it more difficult to list articles 'vhich 
n1ay be liable to capture. Chemical processes have. in 
recent years greatly enlarged the list o:£ n1aterials useful 
for or essential in 'var. Other processes and uses may 
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render son1e n1aterials obsolete. and introduce new cate-
gories. 
Exempt articl-es.-While hospital supplies usually re-
ceived a n1easure of consideration in transit from neutral 
to belligerent countries, other articles were fro1n time to 
ti1ne allo·wed to be exported. Son1e neutral states, o'ving 
to w·eakness, protested and subn1itted to restrictions gen-
erally acln1ittecl to be beyond the limits of legality. Some 
neutral states, for reasons less evident, submitted to un-
justifiable interference 'vith co1n1nerce. 
A ..rticles other than hospital supplies which supposedly 
could be of no service in " .,.ar ''ere so1netimes 1nentioned 
as in the con1n1unication of the Consul General at London 
to the Secretary of State, Dece1nber 23, 1916 : 
Proclmnation issued to-day requires that all articles exported to 
Holland be consigned to Dutch Government, diplmnatic or con-
sular officers, with permission of ~linistry of Foreign Affairs, or 
Netherlands Oversea Trust, except printed matter, returned con-
tainers, worn clothing and personal effects, live animals not used 
for food, sanitary earthenware, pottery and common earthenware, 
books, dolls, toys, wooden clock cases, slate and slate pencils, 
postage stamp and postcard albums. Proclamation apparently 
intended to permit free shipment of articles here mentioned. 
SKINNER. 
(1916 U.8. Foreign Relations Supplement, p. 490.) 
H ospitaZ supplies.-The American Ambassador 1n 
Spain sent on Septe1nber 22, 1914, to the Secretary of 
State the following telegram: 
In an interdew yesterday morning His Majesty informed me 
confidentially condition of wounded soldiers, particularly in French 
hospitals where there are inadequate supplies, especially of band-
uges and absorbent cotton~ was deplorable and expressed an 
earnest wish for our cooperation in relieving this situation. To 
that end he hopes that the United States and Spanish Ambassa-
dors accredited near various European courts now at war will 
1nake a joint request for arrangements between countries of hos-
pital supplies and the such supplies in transit on the high seas may 
be considered by them neither contraband nor conditional contra-
bnnd of war but free. Please telegraph whether Departlnent can 
see its way clear to give to our diplomatic officers concerned the 
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instruttions necessary to realize His l\Iajesty's hope. (1914 U.S. 
Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 831.) 
The An1erican Government immediately com1nunicated 
this request to diplomatic representatives of the United 
States in the belligerent countries. It was naturally sug-
gested that the detailed list of articles should be de-
terinined, but agreement ·in principle was general. The 
Russian reply favored a broad interpretation. The. Ger-
Inan reply follows: 
Your circular September 24. The Foreign Office replies to joint 
request that No. 28, paragraph 1, of the German prize ordinance of 
September 30, 1909, already provides that articles serving ex-
clusively to aid the sick and wounded shall not be treated as 
contraband and may be requisitioned subject to payment compen-
sation only in case of urgent military necessity and when their 
destination is to the territory of the enemy or to territory oc-
cupied by the enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy. (Ibid, 
p. 835.) 
The French Government said: 
'Vhile appreciating the humanitarian attitude of the United 
States Government, the French Government does not think the 
n1oment propitious for agreement between belligerents, even on 
a subject which by its character should be placed beyond' reach 
of conflict. Experience of contempt which certain belligerents 
show for international conventions to which they have agreed 
gives grounds for apprehension that they 'vould not observe a 
new agreement nor execute its provisions as soon as it 'vas to 
their advantage not to do so. The French Government recalls 
that definition of objects mentioned in Article 29 of the Dec-
laration of London was summarily made in the general report at 
the London conference by the drafting cmn1nittee, and it was 
thus agreed that the immunity established under Article 29 ap-
plied to 'drugs and various medicines. , The French GOYPrnment 
adds that while it might be a delicate matter to be 1nore pre-
cise and extend obligations of belligerents during war beyond 
where they were fixed in time of peace, nevertheless it would not 
refuse to study the suggestions of the A1nerican Govern1nent to 
draw up a list of drugs and medicines whose character as "arti- • 
des serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded " shall be 
closely defined. (Ibid, p. 836.) 
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Later much discussion was carried on and Great Britain 
withdrew the list of articles to which the British Gov-
ernment had given exemption. 
The attitude of the British Government was consid-
ered· in a letter of ex-President Taft, then chairman 
of the central com1nittee of the An1erican Red Cross 
to the Secretary of State on l\1ay 8, 1916. In this letter 
Mr. Taft said, 
Since the beginning of the present war, the American Red 
Cross has invited contributions of tnoney and supplies with 
which to aid the w<>unded and suffering of all the belligerents. 
'Ve have shipped to the Red Cross societies of each belligerent 
hospital supplies contributed to us for that purpose. We have 
found no difficulty in sending such article to the Entente Allies. 
'Ve have had to obtain permits from Great Britain for the 
shiptnents to the Red Cross of the Central powers. Until Sep-
tember 1915, there was substantially n<> delay in the granting 
of these pennits by Great Britain. Since that time, we have 
had much difficu~ty in securing them, and the supplies donated 
in kind and designated for the use of the Central powers have 
accumulated in our 'varehouses in New York. A pennit was 
granted for only one shipment since that time-in January of 
this sear. Through your Department, we are now in receipt 
of a communication from the British Government, announcing 
that it d<>es no~ intend to permit any further shipments, unless 
it is a shipment to our own hospital units, in a territory of the 
Central powers. This exception amounts to no concession, for · 
the reason that as the British Governtnent was advised in August 
last, after the first of October, for Jack of funds, we were able 
to maintain n<> hospital units in any of the belligerent countries. 
The authorities of the American Red Cross believe that under 
the Geneva convention, to which the United States and all the 
belligerent powers are signatories, the United States has the 
treaty right to insist that articles serving exclusively to aid the 
sick and wounded in the fonn of hospital supplies, shipped by 
the American Red Cross to the Red Cross of the Central powers, 
shall not be declared c<>ntraband, but shall be allowed safe-
conduct to their destination. (1916 U.S. Foreign· Relations, Sup-
plement, p. 948.) 
Contraband distinctions.-... A .. s 'vas sho,vn in the World 
War, it is difficult and at ti1nes i1npossible to distinguish 
bet,veen absolute and conditional contraband. By na-
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ture, some goods may equally serve the combatant and 
nonco1nbatant population. If a consignment of goods is 
unquestionably for the civil" population in a given area, 
these goods may in fact make it possible to send to the 
forces other goods 'vhich would have been essential in 
that area without the consignment and it has been held 
that it thus 1nakes little difference which goods go to 
the forces as the result is the same. The means of trans-
portation and 1nethods of 'varfare have so far changed 
that nearly all parts of a state may serve its forces and 
nearly all goods may be of use for the forces. Indeed 
in the World War Ger1nan courts seemed to regard all 
ports of England as ports which could be considered 
bases and the British seemed to regard practically all 
goods as of military use. 
The distinctions bet,veen absolute and conditional con-
traband came to have little significance and to be little 
applied in practice. During the World vVar Inost states 
participating in the conflict formally abolished or tacitly 
disregarded the distinction. 
Situation I (a) involves two matters: (1) the aboli-
tion of the distinction between conditional and absolute 
contraband; (2) the treatment of all goods bound for an 
enemy country as contraband. 
Contraband consists of articles which a neutral 1nay 
not furnish to one belligerent without risk of capture 
by the other belligerent. The essential ite1ns for con-
sideration would be the nature of the article and the 
destination. 
Goods of the nature of contraband o£ which capture 
1night be justified would be such as 'vould aid the bellig-
erent in the conduct of the war. In early days 'vhen the 
conduct of the war depended almost 'vholly upon sup-
plying the enrolled armed forces with the simple imple-
Inents of 'var, lists 'vere comparatively easy to draw up 
and did not vary greatly from year to year. Pitch-balls 
and javelins 1night be included in a contraband list, as 
in the treaties with S'veden, 1783, and son1e other early 
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treaties o:f the United States, but cotton and oil and 
many other articles 'vere definitely excluded :from the 
list, and it 'vas provided they " shall not by any pre-
tended interpretation be con1prehended among pro-
hibited or contraband· goods " unless bound to places 
"besieged, blocked, or invested " so as to be "nearly sur-
rounded by one o:f the belligerent powers." 
The intention o:f such agree1nents 'vas to confine the 
list of contraband to such articles as 'vere actually :for 
'var use. Manifestly there:fore :for all contraband arti-
cles the destination 'vas a matter o:f equal importance 
with the nature o:f the article itsel:f, :for i:f the article 
'vhatever its nature,. was not destined :for 'var use it 
'vould not be liable as contraband. Speaking o:f articles 
o:f ordinary use such as provisions, Mr. Justice Story in 
the case o:f the Oonunercen, 1816, said, "i:f destined :for 
the army or navy o:f the ene1ny, or :for his ports o:f naval 
or military equip1nent, they are deemed contraband." 
(1 Wheat. 387.) 
The attitude o:f leading states has varied in regard to 
"~hat articles and when articles might be treated as 
conditional contraband. Even during the World War 
there were many conflicting opinions. 
I:f a state mobilizes its whole population and all its re-
sources :for war, evidently it will be difficult i:f not impos-
sible to distinguish a1nong consignments destined :for that 
state, and anything bound :for the state, unless exempted 
on humanitarian grounds, 1nay be liable to capture as 
contraband. The grounds o:f humanity would exempt 
articles whose sole use would be :for medicinal and surgi-
cal purposes and articles necessary :for Red Cross opera-
tions. 
The changing use and impossibility o:f determining 
what may be o:f use in war :from day to day and the pos-
sibility o:f mobilization o:f population would there:fore 
justi:fy the declaration that the distinction bet,veen abso-
lute and conditional contraband is abolished. 
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All goods other than those solely for humanitarian and 
Red Cross use might be declared contraband .. 
Early blockades.2-Some of the recent contentions in 
regard to blockades are similar to those made as early as 
the seventeenth century. The idea. of a place besieged on 
land "\Vas coming to be applied to a port and for a ti1ne 
it "\Vas held that it should be closed by the enemy on all 
sides, landward as "\vell as sea 'vard. In the seventeenth 
century, however, some of the pronouncements speak of 
the ancient practice of forbidding transport of goods to 
certain areas under penalty and there seem to have been 
such proclamations as early as the thirteenth century~ 
Of course, there was great variety ·of practice in these 
early days. rrhe Dutch notification of June 26, 1630, de-
clared in accord with ancient usage that vessels bound for 
enemy ports of Flanders, sailing from or entering, would 
with their cargoes be liable to confiscation. There were 
even in early days controversies in regard to what de-
gree of force was essential to render such proclan1a tions 
effective from a legal standpoint. Treaties of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries refer to ports " besieged, 
blocked, or invested " and some prescribe how many ships. 
shall be before a. port in order that the blockade may be 
legal or how strong a battery 1nust be on shore. The need 
of specification of li1nits to which the blockade would ex-
tend caine later. Under article XIII of the treaty be-
t,veen the United States and Sweden and N or"\vay, 1816, 
merchant vessels of either, "\vhen one 'vas at 'var and the· 
other "\vas neutral, 'vere entitled to notification of block-
ade at the line unless it could be proved that the neutral 
vessel kne'v or should have known of the blockade. 
Declaration of Paris, 1856.-The Declaration of Paris 
of 1856 "\vas accepted as stating the approved attitude 
upon blockade in the 1nidclle of the nineteenth century. 
This declaration upon blockade "\vas " blockade in order 
2 For treatment of special aspects of blockade, see ~a val War College-
publications, 1901-32. 
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to be binding 1nust be effective-that is to say maintained 
by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast 
of the enemy." This declaration has been repeatedly 
reaffirmed even during the World War. Manifestly the 
actual lvords 1nay not be taken too literally for if they 
'vere strictly construed, blockade would cease to be bind-
ing when a single in,vard breech should occur, though 
egress fron1 the COast "\VOUld not be considered in the 
interpretation. 'Vhat it "\vas really ailned to prevent 
"'"US resort to paper blockades by requiring a reasonably 
adequate blockading force before the coast 'vhich was 
declared blockaded. 
As 'vas said in the Supre1ne Court of the United States 
in 1899 in the case of the 0 linde R odrigttes .· 
But it can not be that a vessel actually captured in atten1pting 
to enter a blockaded port, after warning entered on her log by a 
cruiser off that port only a few days before, could dispute the 
efficiency of the force to "·hich she was subjected. 
As v~·e hold that an effective blockade is a blockade so effective 
as to make it dangerous in fact for vessels to attempt to enter 
the blockaded port, it follows that the question of effectiveness is 
not controlled by the number of the blockading force. In other 
words, the position can not be maintained that one n1odern 
cruiser though sufficient in fact is not sufficient as 1natter of la,v. 
(174 u.s. 510.) 
Declaration of London and blockade.-The provisions 
of the unratified Declaration of London, 1909, 'vere 
agreed upon by representatives of the naval powers after 
full discussion. Article 1 of the Declaration of London 
stated, 
A blockade n1ust be limited to the ports and coasts belonging 
to or occupied by the enemy. 
The purpose of this article was, viewing blockade as 
a war n1easure, to direct its consequences only against 
the enemy. 'fhe Declaration of London regarded the 
statement in the Declaration of Paris as the first neees-
sary condition and as a matter upon which "for a. long 
tjme there has been universal agreement.." Detailed 
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rules "\Vere prescribed :for the. establishing and ra1s1ng 
of blockade. 
Article 18 of the Declaration of London states that, 
The blockading forces n1ust not bar access to the ports or to 
the coasts of neutrals. 
In the general report presented to the naval conference 
on behalf of the drafting committee, it was said of 
article 18, 
This rule has been thought necessary for the better safe-
guarding of the co1nmercial interests of neutral countries; it 
completes Article 1, according to which a blockade n1ust be liln-
ited to the ports and coasts of the ene1ny, which implies that, 
since it is an operation of war, it should not be directed against 
a neutral port, in spite of the interest that a belligerent may 
have in it because of the part played by that neutral port in 
supplying his adversary. (1909 Naval 'Var College, Interna-
tional Law Topics, p. 53.) 
During the 'vars bet,ve.en 1909 and 1914 the provisions 
of the Declaration of London in regard to blockade were 
follo,ved. 
During the early days of the World vV ar there 'vere 
son1e slight changes in the provisions. in regard to pre--
suinption of knowledge of blockade. In the areas out-
~ide of Western Europe the blockade was declared 'vith 
the understood respect :for ordinary rules. 
A1nerican views.-Early in the 'Vorld vVar contro-
versies arose in regard to the use of ships in the neigh-
borhood of the North Sea. Great Britain and Gern1any 
particularly argued with neutrals in regard to violation 
of neutral rights. The Government o:f the United States 
proposed adherence to the Declaration of London, but 
this "\Vas not adopted. The Govern1nent of the United 
States also protested against the extension of interfer-
ence \vith American trade and British Orders in Council 
·were mentioned in con1munications from the Deparhnent 
of State as early as September 29, 1914, as n1enacing 
"the commercial rights of the United States as a neutral, 
in violation o:f the generally accepted rules of interna-
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tional la,v." (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement 
234.) Later in referring to British and French declara-
tions as to retaliation upon neutral commerce with Ger-
Inany, the Secretary of State of the United States said 
on March 5, 1915, 
'Vhile it appears that the intention is to interfere \Vith and take 
into custody all ships both outgoing and incoming trading with 
Germany, which is in effect a blockade of German ports, the rule 
of blockade, that a ship attempting to enter or leave a German 
port regardless of character of its cargo may be condemned, is 
not asserted. 
The language of the declaration is: "the British and French 
Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and 
take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destina-
tion, o·wnership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such 
vessels or cargoes unless they \Vould otherwise be liable to con-
demnation." 
The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state vf 
blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and 
cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together present a 
proposed course of action previously unknown to international 
law. 
As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to 
Ineasure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and car-
goes. The paradoxical situation thus created should be changed 
and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely 
upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when 
no blockade exists. (Ibid., HH5·, Supplement, 132 .. ) 
lVorld lVar discussions.-On August 20, 1914, a 
British Order in Council announeed that the Briti~h, 
French, and Russian naval forces ·would, as affects neu-
tral ships and commerce, conduct the war on similar prin-
ciples. So far as practicable they would act in accord-
nnce 'vith the provisions of the Declaration of London. 
In addition to exchanges in the provisions in regard to 
contraband, these states made some modifications as to 
destination of cargo and presumption of know ledge of 
blockade. The Government of the United States had 
1nacle an effort to have the Declaration of London ac-
cepted without amendment and the Central Powers had 
expressed a favorable att:ttude toward this action. 
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In a note of September 26, 1914, the United States 
said of the Declaration of London : 
As 1night be expected in a settlement of divergent views and 
practices by mutual concession the Declaration of London con-
tains provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the 
respective interests of neutrals and belligerents. But it is now 
proposed by Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable 
to belligerents and to recast other provisions so that they 'vill be 
less favorable to neutral interests. The result is a set of rules 
which limits neutrals' rights far more than does the declaration 
itself treated as a whole. War, in any event, bears heavily upon 
a neutral nation. The interruption of its commerce and the limi-
tations placed upon its trade are sufficiently burdensome under 
the rules of the Declaration of London. In consenting to those 
rules the Government of the United States made great concessions 
on its part and it does not feel that it can, in justice to its own 
people, go further. It cannot consent to the retention of a part 
of this con1pr01nise settlen1ent and to the rejection of another part. 
The adoption of the declaration so modified is contrary to the 
customary procedure incident to co1npr01nise settlements, to the 
express provisions of the declaration itself, and to the spirit 
which induced its signature. (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, 
Supplement, p. 228.) 
1"he British additions and modifications greatly en-
larged the Declaration of London presun1ption as to 
destination and would, according to the An1erican note, 
give to Great Britain "the advantages of an established 
blockade 'vithout the necessity of maintaining it 'vith an 
adequate naval force. The effect of this asserted right 
suggests the result which was sought by the so-called 
'paper blockades' which have been discredited for a 
century, and 'vere repudiated by the Declaration of 
Paris." (I?id, p. 229.) 
In this strong note of Septe1nber 26, 1914, the United 
States further says, 
Finally this Government considers that the Declaration of Lon-
don, as changed by the order in council, would result in such an 
interference with the customary rights of neutral connnerce that 
the United States could not assent to it or subn1it to its enforce-
ment, for the reason that to recognize it as a 1neasure of the 
neutra 1 rights of the United States would, in the 011inion of this 
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Government, be a manifest failure on its part to safeguard the 
interests of American citizens engaged in legitimate traffic with 
the subjects of belligerent and neutTal nations. 
In view of these considerations this Government is obliged to 
inform the Government of His Britannic l\Iajesty that the United 
States would be unable to accept the declaration as thus modified 
though all the belligerents should concur in the modifications sug-
gested by Great Britain. The Government of the United States, 
therefore, reserves all the rights which it has under the law of 
nations in relation to any losses or damages which may occur 
by reason of captures or conden1nations made by the Govern-
ment of Great Britain under the provisions of the Declaration of 
London as 1nodified by the order in council of August 20, 1914. 
(Ibid., p. 231.) 
In the British note of August 22, 1914, referring to 
the Order in Council of August 20, there had been the 
statement, 
The peculiar conditions in the pTesent war due to the fact that 
neutral ports such as Rotterdam are the chief means of access 
to a large part of Germany and that exceptional 1neasures have 
been taken in the enemy country for the control by the Govern-
Inent of the entire supply of foodstuffs have convinced His 
l\Iajesty's Government that modifications are required in the 
applications of Articles 34 and 35 of the declaration. These modi-
fications are contained in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the accompany-
ing order-in-council. (Ibid., p. 219.) 
Paragraphs 3 and 5 here 1nentioned are as follows: 
(3) The destination referred to in Article 33 [use of the armed 
forces or of a government department] may be inferred from any 
sufficient evidence, and (in addition to [the] presun1ption laid 
down in Article 34) shall be presutned to exist if the goods are 
consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state or to or for a 
merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of 
the enemy state. * * * 
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 [ship's papers 
conclusive proof of voyage and port of discharge except when off 
course] of the said declaration, conditional contraband, if shown 
to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to cap-
ture, to whatever port the vessel is bound and at whatever port 
the cargo is to be discharged. (Ibid., p. 220.) 
The Acting Secretary of State Lansing also said in the 
note of September 26, 1914, in regard to interference with 
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commerce to a. neutral port, such as Rotterdam, men-
tioned in the British memorandum, 
Furthermore, if the modifications were acceptable to this Gov-
ernment, it would be unwilling, by accepting thein, to prejudice 
the rights of the Netherlands, the other signatory of the declara-
tion neutral in the present war, whose, interests, as the memo-
randum of the Foreign Office discloses, will be vitally affected by 
the changes proposed. (Ibid., p. 231.) 
The same matter received further consideration in an 
intervie·w· between the American Ambassador and the 
British Foreign Secretary. 
The British purpose he went on to say was to prevent the enemy 
from receiving food and materials for military use and nothing 
more. I explained that the people of the United States had a 
trade with Holland apart from supplies and n1aterials meant 
for Germany and that our Government could not be expected to 
see that sacrificed or interfered with. (Ibid., p. 233.) 
Further correspondence expressed the American desire 
that there should be the minimum interference ·with neu-
tra.l commerce and that the accepted principles of inter-
national la.w should be obserYed. The British Govern-
Inent replied to the effect that, 
We [the British Government] had only two objects in our 
proclamations : To restrict supplies for German army and to re-
strict supply to Germany of 1naterials essential for making of 
munitions of 'var. 'Ve wished to attain these objects with the 
minilnum of interfe·rence with the United States and other neu-
tral com1nerce. (Ibid., p. 237.) 
After much n1ore correspondence and proposals and 
counterproposals in regard to the Declaration of Lon-
don, the Acting Secretary of State 'vithdrew the sugges-
tion that the Declaration of London be a te1nporary code 
of naval "\Varfare and said, 
this Govenunent will insist that the rights and duties of the 
United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by 
the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the 
United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration 
of London ; and that this Government reserves to itself the right 
to enter a protest or dem.and in each case in which those rights 
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and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise inter-
fered with by the authorities of His Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment. (Ibid, p. 258.) 
The British Order in Council o:f March 11, 1915, clear-
ly stated to be in reprisal against the German declaration 
o:f the ·war zone about the United Kingdom, was con-
sidered by some as in effect a blockade, but its provisions 
'vere quite unlike those establishing a blockade and in-
volved consequences :far in excess o:f blockade liabili-
ties. The Order in Council o:f February 16, 1917, sup-
plemental to earlier orders gives an idea. o:f the extent 
to 'vhich under reprisal measures neutrals were expected 
to tolerate interference with their commerce : 
1. A vessel which is encountered at sea on her way to or from 
a port in any neutral country affording means of access to the 
enemy territory without calling at a port in British or Allied ter-
ritory shall, until the contrary is established, be dee1ned to be 
carrying goods with an enemy destination, or of enemy origin, 
and shall be brought in for examination and, if necessary, for 
adjudication before the Prize Court. 
2. Any vessel carrying goods with an ene1ny destination, or of 
enemy origin, shall be liable to capture and conde1nnation in re-
spect of the carriage of such goods; provided that, in the case 
of any vessel which calls at an appointed British or Allied 
port for the examination of her cargo, no sentence of condemna-
tion shall be pronounced in respect only of the carriage of goods 
of enemy origin or destination, and no such presumption as is 
laid down in Article I shall arise. 
3. Goods which are found on the examination of any vessel 
to be goods of enen1y origin or of enemy destination shall be 
liable to condemnation. 
4. Nothing in this Order shall be dee1ned to affect the liability 
of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently 
of this Order. (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1917, p. 9'53.) 
As is evident neutrals were also liable under accepted 
princi pies o:f international law. 
None o:f the Orders in Council specifically used the 
word blockade though the ai1n was to prevent communi-
cation with the enemy. 
In the British men1orandu1n o:f February 20, 1915, it 
was said in justification o:f their action, 
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The Governrnent of Great Britain have frankly declared, in 
concert with the Governn1ent of France, their intention to meet 
the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from 
leaving or entering British or French ports by themselves stop-
ping supplies going to or from Germany for this end. The 
British fleet has instituted a blockade, effectively controlling 
by cruiser "cordon" all passage to and from Germany by sea. 
The difference between the two policies is, however, that while 
our object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain 
it without sacrificing neutral ships or non-combatant lives or 
inflicting upon neutrals the damage that n1ust be entailed 'vhen 
a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice, examination, or 
trial. I must emphasize again that this measure is a natural 
and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods, repug-
nant to all la'v and n1orality, which have been described above, 
which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war, 
and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating. 
(1915 U.S. Foreign R,elations, Supplement, p. 142.) 
This act departed :from the accepted principles o:f in-
ternational la 'v in regard to blockades and later cor-
respondence does not attempt to justify the Orders in 
Council on such grounds. 
Proclaimed blockades in World W ar.-Blockades were 
regularly proclaimed in numerous instances during the 
early years o:f the "'\Vorld "'\Var. 
Austria-Hungary proclaimed in 1914 "that :from Au-
gust 10, at noon, the coast o:f Montenegro will be held in a 
state o:f effective blockade by the Austro-Hungarian na-
val :forces." (1917 Naval War College, International 
Law Documents, p. 53.) 
The Japanese blockade o:f leased territory o:f l(iao-
Chau was somewhat more detailed as to hours o:f grace 
:for departure o:f vessels, etc. 
The successive notHications in regard to the coast of 
the Cameroons show the regularity o:f certain British 
procecl ure. 
FoREIGN 0Fl!ICE, Ap1·il 24, 1915. 
His Majesty's Government have decided to declare a blockade 
of the coast of the Can1eroons as frmn n1idnigh t April 23-24. 
The blockade will extend from the en tranc~ of the Akwayafe 
PROCLAIMED BLOCKADES 37 
River to Bilnbia Creek, and fron1 the Benge mouth of the Sanaga 
River to Campo. 
Forty-eight hours' grace from the time of the commencen1ent 
of the blockade \Vill be given for the departure of neutral ves-
sels fron1 the blockaded area. 
'Yith reference to the notification, elated April 24, 1915, which 
appeared in the London Gazette of April 27 last, His lVIajesty's 
Goyernment give notice that the blockade of the coast of Camer-
oons has l>een raised so far as concerns the coast line frmn the 
Akwayafe River to Bimbia Creek. The blockade still remains in 
force from the Benge mouth of the Sanaga Ri"rer to Campo. 
Foreign Office, January 8, 1916. 
"rith reference to the notification dated January 11, 1916, which 
appeared in the London Gazette of that date, His l\lajesty's Gov-
ernment give notice that the blockade of the coast of the Camer-
oons, which had been maintained in force fr01n the Benge mouth 
of the Sanaga River to Can1po, is completely raised as from mid-
night (Greenwich time), February 29-l\1arch 1. (Ibid., p. 135.) 
1,he French notification of the blockade of Greece 
gives a detailed staten1ent. 
The Government of the French Republic, having agreed with its 
allies to declare a blockade of Greece, hereby gives notice of the 
conditions by which they will proceed. 
The blockade is declared effective fron1 December 8, 1916, at 8 
o'clock in the nwrning. 
The blockade extends to the coasts of Greece and comprises the 
islands of Eubee, Zarite, and Sainte-1\1aure- fro1n a point situated 
at 39°20' north, 20°20' east of Greenwich, to a point situated 
39°50' north, 22°50' east of Greenwich, as well as the islands 
actually under the dependence or the occupation of the Royal 
Hellenic authorities. 
Vessels of third po\vers finding themselves in blockaded ports 
can freely depart until December 10 at 8 o'clock in the morning. 
The order has been given to the commander in chief of the 
blockading forces to proceed in1mediately to notify the local 
authorities of the present declaration. 
Paris, Decen1ber 7, 1916. (Ibid., p. 93.) 
Export proldbitions and embargoes.-The extren1e 
measures of the belligerents in regard to 1novement of 
goods in the W oriel War led neutrals to prohibit the ex-
port of certain articles. Sometimes neutral prohibitions 
\Vere resorted to in order to preYent undue depletion of 
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national stocks or resources and someti1nes in order that 
:foreign com1merce might not be closed by belligerent re-
straints. Neutral states in close proximity to belligerent 
areas such as Denmark, Nether lands, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland issued lists o:f articles o:f which export 
'vas prohibited. These lists varied in comprehensive-
ness. The lists o:f Greece and Spain "\vere short. The 
list o:f s,veden was long. That o:f Switzerland enumer-
ating more than 200 articles, e.g., "acetones" or cate-
gories, e.g., "telephone apparatus, as well as component 
parts thereof, notably microphones, field cables, insulat-
ing rubber, electric batteries; electric ignition plugs :for 
automobiles" (1915 Naval War College, International 
La'v Topics, p. 53), was about average in number o:f 
na1ned articles or categories. 
The belligerents placed restrictions or embargoes upon 
the export and transit o:f certain goods and blacklisted 
persons or firms so that the restraints on co1nmerce be-
canle o:f serious consequence to many states. The Brit~ 
ish list was long and many firms were placed on the 
blacklist. The German list contained hundreds or arti-
cles arranged under careful classifications, as: I. Ani-
Inals and animal products: (a) Living animals; (b) 
meat, meat products, fish (not live); (c) milk, butter, 
ani1nal :fats; (d) refuse, bristles, bones, etc. Under 
each o:f the above, detailed lists were given. 
In spite o:f the self-imposed restrictions o:f neutral 
states, the belligerents continually added to the difficul-
ties o:f carrying on neutral co1nmerce. 
Belligerent embargoes.-(a) British. There 'vere 
several orders prohibiting certain exports :fron1 Great 
Britain during 1914 and 1915. These 'vere issued under 
" The customs and inland revenue act, 1879 ", " The ex-
portation o:f arms act, 1900 ", and " The custon1s exporta-
tion prohibition act, 1914." The proclamation o:f Feb-
ruary 3, 1915, and the orders of J\1arch 2 and 18, o:f 
April 15, 21, and 26, of May 6 and 20, of June 2 and 
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24, and of July 8 and 19, were issued in pursuance of the 
above acts. In August 1914 it 'vas deemed expedient to 
consolidate the proclamation and orders and a new 
proclamation to that end was made. The proclamation 
named goods in three categories: (a) exportation pro-
hibited to all destinations, (b) exportation prohibited to 
other than British possessions and protectorates, and (c) 
exportation prohibited to all foreign countries in Europe 
and on the l\1editerranean and Black Seas other than 
France, Russia (except Baltic ports), Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal. 
(b) Ger1nan. Under General Imperial Order of July 
31, 1914, embargoes 'vere placed on exportation, transit, 
and carriage of ar1ns, ammunition, po,vder, etc. A long 
list of prohibited exports w·as published and to this arti-
cles 'vere added by supplementary lists. This list be-
came sufficiently comprehensive to include floating docks, 
truffles, and broccoli. No distinction ,vas made as to 
destination in the German list. 
It might be argued that the belligerents prohibited the 
export of the articles na1ned in their lists because these 
articles 'vere essential for war purposes or needed for 
the war in progress. If this 'vas the case, the list issued 
by one belligerent might be regarded by the other bellig-
(:~rent as the basis for the enun1eration of articles 'vhich 
it "rould proclaim contraband and it would be difficult of 
a neutral to 1naintain that these articles which the bellig-
erent had itself declared thus essential might not be 
placed in the list of contraband. 
Retaliation.-During the ear_ly days of the World \iV ar7 
action not sanctioned by international law but under 
Orders in Council was not held in British courts as con-
clusive against neutrals. In the decision in the case of 
the Zarnora in 1916 it was said, however: 
A prize court must, of course, deal judicially with all questions 
which came before it for determination, and it would be im-
possible for it to act judicially if it were bound to take its orders 
from one of the parties to the proceedings. 
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In the second place, the law which the prize court was to 
adn1inister was not the national, or, as it was. sometimes called, 
the n1unicipal law, but the law of nations-in other words, 
international law. It was worth while dwelling for a moment on 
that distinction. Of course, the prize court was a n1unicipal 
court ancl its decrees and orders owed their validity to n1unicipal 
law. The law \Vhich it enforced Inight, therefore, in one sense, 
be considered a branch of tnunicipal law. Nevertheless, the dis· 
tinction between n1unicipal and international law was well defined. 
A court which administered municipal law was bound by and 
gave effect to the law as laid down by the sovereign State \Vhich 
called it into being. It need inquire only what that law _was, 
but a court which administered international law must ascertain 
and give effect to a law which was not laid down by any particu-
lar State, but originated in the practice and usage long observed 
by civilized nations in their relations with each other or in 
·express international agreement. * * * 
The fact, however, that the prize courts in this country would 
be bound by acts of the imperial legislature afforded no ground 
tor arguing that they were bound by the executive orders of the 
J{ing ·in council. * * * 
An order authorizing reprisals will be conclusive as to the 
facts which are recited as showing that a case for reprisals exists, 
:and will have clue weight as showing what, in the opinion of 
llis l\Iajesty's advisers, are the best or only 1neans of meeting 
the etnergency; but this \Vill not preclude the right of any party 
.aggrieved to contend, or the right of the court to hold, that 
these means are unlawful, as entailing on neutrals a degree of 
inconvenience unreasonable, considering all the circun1stances of 
the case. (1916 A.C. 77; 1922 Naval 'Var College, International 
.Law Documents, p. 126.) 
"\Vhile the right of retaliation as against an ene1ny 1nay 
depend upon the action of the ene1ny, the justification 
·of retaliation to,vard an ene1ny does not create new 
rights tor either belligerent as regard neutrals. The de-
gree o£ retaliation as regards the offending belligei·ent 
\Vill naturally depend upon the character o£ the act 
against \vhich retaliatory measures are instituted. The 
-contention son1etimes advanced that one belligerent 1nay 
proportion his retaliatory Ineasures so as to re1nedy evils 
to \vhich neutrals may have been or Inay later be sub-
jected preslunes that this belligerent is defending or 
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maintaining neutral rights which is not within the sphere 
DI law:ful belligerent action and even n1ight give grounds 
ior the other belligerent to claim a nonneutral relation 
bet,veen its opponent and the protected neutral. There 
may be a wide divergence o:f interpretation between neu-
trals and belligerents as to their respective rights. It 
is entirely within the competence o:f a neutral to deter-
mine what action it may take. to maintain its rights and 
not :for one o:f the belligerents to take upon itsel:f the 
definition and defense o:f assumed neutral rights under a 
plea o:f retaliation. 
The neutral is, o:f course, liable to such inconvenience 
.and restraint as 1na.y be incidental to the exercise o:f 
proper retaliatory action aimed directly at one belliger-
€nt by the other, but retaliatory measures should not be 
-aimed directly or indirectly at neutrals. 
To argue that one belligerent may be justified in inter-
iering with neutral rights under retaliatory measures to 
-secure the comn1on good is to prejudge the merits o:f the 
contest or to affir1n as usually is the case o:f each bellig-
~rent that its cause is the just cause. 
Retaliat1:on 1neasu~res, 1914.-The German proclama-
tion o:f February 4, 1915, declared that a:fter February 
18 the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland 
and the waters o:f the English Channel would be a war 
zone within 'vhich all ene1ny merchant vessels 'vonld be 
destroyed and within which neutral vessels expose# thmn-
selves to danger. The Ame.rican Secretary o:f State 
viewed the act o:f Germany with " grave concern " and 
·said on February 10, 
It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government 
that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels 
<On the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a block-
.ade is proclaimed and effectively n1aintained, which this Govern-
ment does not understand to be proposed in this case. To de-
·clare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel enter-
ing a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly 
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detennining its belligerent nationality and the contraband char-
acter of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval 
warfare tba t this Government is reluctant ro believe that tlte 
Imperial GoYernment of Germany in this case contemplates it 
as possible. (1915 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 98.) 
The German E1nbassy in vVashington had on Feb-
ruary 7 trans1nitted to the Secretary o:f State a "Meln-
orandum o:f the German Government concerning retalia-
tion against Great Britain's illegal interference ·with 
trade bet,veen neutrals and Germany " in 'vhich 1nention 
'vas 1nade of the British disregard of the f)eclaration of 
Paris and o:f the Declaration of London. 
This introduction o:f the idea o:f retaliation into the 
relations between the belligerents would threaten the 
rights o:f neutrals. I:f the neutrals were weak, vacillat-
ing, or hesitating in n1aintaining their rights, the re-
taliatory acts of belligerents would n1ore and n1ore iin-
pinge upon neutral rights. The belligerents might even 
argue that as neutral rights had been generally ad-
mitted as equable as regards belligerents and neutrals 
on the supposition that they 'vould be maintained, any 
:failure to 1naintain these rights as against one belliger-
ent would be an act in :favor of that belligerent. Indeed 
during the World War each belligerent protested the 
:failure o:f the United Stat€s to insist upon its nentral 
rights which according to the protests had been disre-
garded by the other belligerent. 
Germany in supporting the establishing o:f the war 
zone about Great Britain and Ireland and in the English 
Channel, in a note o:f February 16, 1915, said, 
Gern1any is to all intents and purposes cut off fr01n oversea 
supplies with the toleration, tacit or protesting, of the neutrals 
regardless of whether it is a question of goods which are absolute 
contraband or only conditional contraband or not contraband at 
all, following the law generally recognized before the outbreak of 
the war. On the other band England with the indulgence of neu-
tral governments is not only being provided with such goods as are 
not contraband or merely conditional contraband, namely, food-
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stuffs, raw material, et cetet·a., although these are treated by 
England when Germany is in question as absolute contraband, 
but also with goods which have been regularly and unquestion-
ably acknowledged to be absolute contraband. The German Gov-
ernment believe that they are obliged to point out very particu-
larly and with the greatest emphasis, that a trade in arms exists 
between American manufacturers and Germany's enemies which 
is estimated at many hundred million marks. 
The German Government have given due recognition to the fact 
that as a matter of forn1 the exercise of rights and the tolera-
tion of 'vrong on the part of neutrals is limited by their pleasure 
alone and involves no formal breach of neutrality. The Gennan 
Government have not in consequence 1nade any charge of formal 
breach of neutrality. The German Government can not, howeve·r, 
do otherwise, especiapy in the interest of absolute clearness in 
the relations between the two countries, than to emphasize that 
they, in common with the public opinion in Gennany, feel them-
selves placed at a great disadvantage through the fact that the 
neutral powers have hitherto achieved no success or only an un-
meaning success in their assertion of the right to trade with 
Germany, acknowledged to be legitimate by international law, 
whereas they make unlimited use of their right to tolerate trade 
in contraband with England and our other enemies. Conceded 
that it is the formal right of neutrals not to protect their legiti-
n1ate trade with Germany and even to allow themselves know-
ingly and willingly to be induced by England to restrict such 
trade, it is on the other hand not less their good right, although 
unfortunately not exercised, to stop trade in contraband, espe-
cially the trade in arms, with Germany's enen1ies. * * * 
The German Government repeat that in the scrupulous con-
sideration for neutrals hitherto practised by then1 they have 
determined upon the measures planned only under the strongest 
compulsion of national self-preservation. Should the American 
Government at the eleventh hour succeed in removing, by virtue 
of the weight which they have the right and ability to throw 
into the scales of the fate of peoples, the reasons which have 
made it the imperative duty of the German Government to take 
the action indicated, should the American Government in par-
ticular find a way to bring about the observation of the Declara-
tion of London on the part of the powers at war with Gern1any 
and thereby to render possible for Ger1nany the legitimate supply 
of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, the German Govern-
ment would recognize this as a service which could not be too 
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highly estimated in favor of more humane conduct of war and 
would gladly draw the necessary conclusions from the ne\v situa-
tion thus created. (Ibid. p. 113.) 
. Pages of somewhat similar correspondence brought 
replies and counter replies from various neutrals and 
belligerents, but little in the way of observance of the 
accepted laws of mariti1ne warfare. 
The armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800 as well as the 
neutrality of the United States in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century and others showed that some means 
other than note writing might be essential to preserva-
tion of neutral rights. Switzerland took such means for 
safeguarding its territorial and aerial jurisdiction from 
invasion. The Nether lands extended protection also to 
its maritiine jurisdiction.- The Hague Conventions, as 
article 10, Convention V, 1907, recognize the possibility 
that neutrals may be called upon to maintain their 
rights, and this article states, 
The fact of a neutral Power repelling even by force, attempts 
to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. 
Sunvmary.-Modern conditions, as shown in the n1any 
and lengthy communications during the World War: 
have changed the ideas as to the actual conduct of war. 
As to contraband, it has become increasingly difficult 
to employ intelligently such categories as contraband by 
nature because some article which by nature is specially 
essential to the life of a population at peace 1nay be 
even absolutely essential to the state forces in time of 
'var. A ne'v invention or discovery during war may 
transform a category of articles, which at the beginning 
of the war were solely o£ use for the peaceful popula-
tion, into essential war material. The list of such ar-
ticles should ordinarily be determined by the belligerent 
and each belligerent would normally expect that the 
other might include in his contraband list any article 
included in the list of the opponent. There is also evi-
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dent in modern times the influence of the unfavorable 
attitude which one or more neutral states may take to-
·ward a contraband list which does not bear the marks 
of 1nilitary need justifying interference with neutral 
goods. 
There is one category of goods the exe1nption fro1n 
capture of "\V hich is generally recognized. That is, ar-
ticles serving exclusively for the care of the sick and 
·wounded. It is ·for the mutual advantage. of both 
belligerents that such supplies be abundant. 
As to blockade, it may be sufficient to repeat what "\vas 
said in article 18, and the con1ment upon that article, of 
the Declaration of London: 
The blockading forces must not bar access to the ports or to the 
coasts of neutrals. (1009 Naval 'Var College, International Law 
Topics, p. 53.) 
\Vorld War practice and the general opinion of "\vriters 
does not afford sanction to the clai1n of a right of vessels 
to pass through a neutral river to a belligerent port. The 
fluvial and mariti1ne navigation of a neutral state is 
within the jurisdiction of that state and not subject to. 
regulation by a belligerent. Outside of neutral jurisdic-
tion the belligerent may act in aecord with the laws of 
war. Belligerent forces 1nay, of course, seize outside of 
neutral jurisdiction vessels having a belligerent destina-
tion or having on board goods bound for a belligerent. 
Such vessels in Situation I (b) "\vould not, when brought 
before a prize court, be liable for penalties under the 
laws of blockade. 
SOLUTION 
(a) State X 1nay declare all distinction between ab-
solute and conditional contraband abolished, but this 
does not make all goods contraband nor does it give to 
state X a right to treat all articles bound for Y as 
contraband. 
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(b) State Y may not lawfully maintain a blockade of 
the ports of state X to ·which there is access only through 
a navigable river of neutral state D, nor may state Y 
prevent vessels from entering the river Dana, though it 
may seize vessels outside neutral jurisdiction when trans·-
porting prohibited goods having an ulti1mate enemy 
destination. 
